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IMMERSED IN DIFFICULTY: THE PROBLEM OF SUSPENSION OF 
DISBELIEF IN TRANSMEDIA AND VR EXPERIENCES 
James Dalby, University of Gloucestershire.  jdalby@glos.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT. 
The term Immersion is used widely in professional discourse and industry publications within the 
UK/US TV and film industries, not only as a self-evident aim of Transmedia and VR content, but also 
as an achievable goal.  Unlike games industries, TV and cinema have traditionally taken the notion of 
Suspension of Disbelief (SoD) as relatively self-evident, and Immersion appears as its logical 
extension. Beginning with Holland’s (1967) psychoanalytical approach to SoD as removal of the 
‘desire to act’ function by ‘framing’ texts away from reality, this paper suggests that by including the 
‘frame’ within the experience in Transmedia and VR, SoD is not achievable and therefore any attempts 
to approach Immersion in this way will fail. The paper argues that Immersion in such experiences is 
possible, if approached in the sense that Salen & Zimmerman (2004) suggest, where the actual act of 
involvement becomes the immersive experience, and not the displacement of sense and story. 
 
PAPER. 
All forms of entertainment strive to create suspension of disbelief, a state in which the […] mind 
forgets that it is being subjected to entertainment and instead accepts what it perceives as reality. 
  François Dominic Laramée; ‘Immersion’ 
 
Broadcasters are planning to take viewers beyond traditional flat-screen viewing and tell stories in 
increasingly immersive ways in 2016. 
  Alex Farber; ‘Broadcast Magazine’.  January 2016 
 
We were interested in how we could make short-form drama more immersive and ideally help us to 
reach younger audiences.  We wanted to up the levels of interaction, but not distract people from the 
story. 
  Robin Moore; BBC Head of Innovation.  May 2016 
 
In the last decade, a new lexicon of terminology and ideas that have previously been more generally 
associated with the computing and games industries, has been seen with increasing frequency in the 
discourse and industry publications of the UK and US television and film industries.  In TV alone, 
programme-makers are now content-producers and programmes are asset-brands; multiplatform and 
multi-touchpoint in nature, and based around UX design concepts with developmental analytics, 
IP/API workflows and ‘3G’ commissioning just some of the ongoing computing-inspired hot-topics in 
the industry.  In terms of contemporary content, one term stands out as becoming synonymous with 
film and TV industries’ efforts to offer new audience-pleasing experiences, and also as a byproduct, 
synonymous with the technology being trialed to produce these experiences, such as Transmedia-
technologies and Virtual Reality.  This term is Immersion. 
 
This paper argues that immersion within Transmedia and Virtual Reality experiences is a misleading 
concept, in need of interrogation and classification, and moreover that it is not possible to achieve, if 
the definition of immersion is taken to be similar to Laramée’s quote above.  This is to do with it being 
– in this form - the logical extension of the idea of suspension of disbelief, itself a term regularly 
treated as being somewhat self-evident in traditional television and film experiences.  However, the 
paper also argues that immersion in Transmedia and VR content is possible, if approached in the sense 
that Salen & Zimmerman (2004) suggest, where the actual act of involvement becomes the immersive 
experience, rather than the displacement of sense and story.   
 
It is important at this stage to emphasise precisely what is being discussed concerning immersion and 
its relationship to TV and film experiences.  The paper does not focus directly on the actual act of 
‘immersion’ in VR and Transmedia, although this naturally plays an important part in the discussion, 
but instead its relationship to the experiences intended by film and TV professionals, wanting a more 
immersive experience for the types of content already produced.  Narrative fiction springs readily to 
mind for example, or factual content that aims to bring the viewer ‘closer’ to the subject perhaps, or 
maybe interaction in TV entertainment formats.  We can see the twin aims of contemporary TV and 
film in this approach; on the one hand to create more engaging experiences to reach new audiences, 
and on the other, potentially to find new ways to access audience analytic data to help reduce the risk 
of unpopularity inherent in creating new content.  The reason this definition is important is that the 
immersive capacities of these technologies are currently being investigated widely in many fields; 
within VR alone for example, experiences such as the Galactica ride at UK theme park Alton Towers, 
political art pieces such as The Guardian’s 6x9: Solitary Confinement piece or the iAnimal animal 
rights experience, and Royal London Hospital’s live VR surgery transmission are all texts that stand 
apart from the subjects discussed in this paper.  For example, in terms of the ‘immersive’ nature of the 
technology itself, the recent success of the Oxford University team using VR to treat patients suffering 
from social anxiety and paranoia offers evidence of the technology’s capacity to partially ‘fool the 
senses’ in the manner seemingly expressed by Laramée above.  This paper then will focus specifically 
on whether the introduction of these technologies into the content we normally associate with TV and 
film will actually create the desired immersive experiences that producers are looking for, and indeed 
whether ‘immersion’ should even be a goal of doing so. 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that we can discuss the shift in terminology mentioned above as occurring over 
the last ten years, since it has now been a decade since Jenkins (2006) first coined the term 
‘Transmedia’, and the concepts that it embodies – differing as they did at the time from the 
unsuccessful convergence strategy of ‘360’ (‘360 Commissioning’, ‘360 Technologies’) – have been 
gradually filtering into the way programmes and films are conceived, pitched, commissioned and 
produced since.  It was in relation to Transmedia content and experiences that ‘immersion’ began to be 
used with frequency in industry debate and publications, and while of course the term was in-use prior 
to this to discuss more traditional film and television experiences, the implied meaning and use of the 
term in relation to Transmedia inferred something more, as we shall see.  More recently again, the 
current race amongst various production companies and studios to harness the potential of Virtual 
Reality - especially coinciding as it does with the capacity to produce ‘filmed’ VR content in a 
meaningful way for the first time - has seen the idea of ‘immersion’ and pursuit of ‘immersive content’ 
come to the fore as both a self-evident goal, and a byword for new technological experiences.  It is 
worth mentioning at this point that while we use the term Virtual Reality in relation to the 360-degree 
content being produced for TV and film, the correct definition of Virtual Reality is an experience 
similar to that newly offered by the HTC Vive, where users participate and interact with an experience.  
What we are concerned with currently in TV and film is simply 360-degree filmed or animated content 
in which the audience member has no participatory function other than to watch, either on a screen or 
via a headset.  However, the industry has appropriated the ‘VR’ term to refer to this content, and for the 
sake of consistency this paper will do the same. 
 
What is interesting about both Transmedia and VR is that their underlying principles are a lot less 
contemporary than some of their current film and television proponents seem ready to acknowledge; 
Virtual Reality has of course been in conceptual existence at least since the 1980s, and while 
Transmedia as a term is a 21
st
 Century concept, the idea of multi-form narratives and even the ‘rabbit-
hole’ story experiences we associate with it could be argued to be traceable back to texts such as The 
Wizard of Oz in the early 20
th
 Century for example, or perhaps Japan’s Media Mix from the 1950s and 
1960s onwards.  Indeed, given that both technologies bear more than a passing resemblance to ideas 
that existed first in the realms of science-fiction (for example, Phillip K. Dick’s Eye in the Sky (1957) 
or The Electric Ant (1969) arguably predict such technologies with storylines involving computer-
controlled realities) and there is of course a strong tradition of theorists discussing the potential debates 
surrounding technologies before they actually exist, as a result there is now a wealth of excellent 
predictive theory on both disciplines.  Ryan for example noted in 2001 that “…since the idea of VR is 
very much a part of our cultural landscape, we don’t have to wait [until the new century reaches 
adulthood] to explore the perspectives it opens on representation”.  In addition, the idea of immersion 
that has started to become associated with both Transmedia and VR has already been widely debated 
by ludologists writing about the games industry for many years, with perhaps the most traditional 
interpretation of the term – as outlined by Laramée above – arguably disproven on a number of 
occasions.  Yet despite this, the many lessons learned by that industry and predicted by various 
theorists appear to have been either overlooked or bypassed by the contemporary film and TV 
industries in their approach to Transmedia and VR, an approach that this paper contends is erroneous 
and problematic, as we shall see. 
 
To understand why this might be, we must first look at what is being referred to by the term 
‘immersion’.  Farber’s use above is just one example of the loosely-defined and interchangeable way 
that it is being introduced to contemporary TV discourse; both as a desirable outcome for programme-
makers and audiences alike, and also as an achievable one through technology (the inference that 
moving content away from ‘traditional flat screens’ will make it more immersive).  Moore’s comment 
(above) in relation to VR for BBC Children’s experiences being more ‘immersive’ is a similar case in 
point.  Both examples illustrate the way the term is being regularly used in relation to TV content and 
audiences, and both appear to incorporate the term in a manner similar to Laramée’s example.   
 
One method of interpreting Laramée might be in an almost Cartesian sense, which at its most extreme 
perspective would share more than a passing resemblance to the central mechanism of classic 
‘solipsist’ sci-fi narratives, such as perhaps The Matrix or Existenz.  The notion that sensory input we 
experience from eyes and ears, and perhaps in the future from tactile and olfactory senses, might one 
day be so richly detailed and persuasive that we are no longer able to penetrate its artifice – we are 
sensorily displaced – is well-known, but also not especially credible as an explanation of his intention.  
A more sympathetic interpretation of the quote reads it as simply attempting to convey the form of 
immersion we are familiar with when we experience the more traditional ‘displacement’ effect of 
media texts, such as literature, radio, television and movies.  As Ryan (2001) notes, the language we 
use to describe the process of reading a good book, as an example, is worthy of a novel itself. 
 
The reader plunges under the sea (immersion), reaches a foreign land (transportation), is taken 
prisoner (being caught up in the story, being a captured audience) and loses contact with all other 
realities (being lost in a book). 
 
Interestingly, whether one takes the science-fiction interpretation of immersion, or the more traditional 
literary sense of the term as the flesh on the bones of Laramée’s statement, both point to the idea of the 
audience member being removed from their understanding of space and time in the present moment, 
and being displaced elsewhere, what Salen and Zimmerman (2004) describe as the ‘Immersive 
Fallacy’. 
 
The immersive fallacy is the idea that the pleasure of a media experience lies in its ability to 
sensually transport the participant into an illusory, simulated reality.  According to the immersive 
fallacy, this reality is so complete that ideally the frame falls away so that the player truly believes 
that he or she is part of an imaginary world. 
 
It is perhaps understandable that this interpretation of Immersion would naturally dovetail with 
technologies such as VR and Transmedia; both are designed to place the audience member within the 
content, with VR removing the participant sensorily from their current environment, and Transmedia 
placing the audience member in a participatory role of decision-making and interaction with the 
narrative.  We may even be able to state – in the case of VR at least – that the participant is immersed, 
at least in terms of sense-data, as in the case of the Oxford University ‘paranoia’ project mentioned 
above.  However, in the sense that we are referring to as ‘displacement immersion’ and which is 
inferred by the quotes above, both technologies have an inherent contradiction that renders them unable 
to provide this type of content immersion for traditional film and TV experiences, such as drama or 
documentary pieces. 
 
Salen and Zimmerman actually interrogate the same Laramée quote above as their example of the 
immersive fallacy, and in writing about the way immersion relates to computer games, offer their own 
reasons for the abandonment of the ‘displacement’ notion of immersion from a ludological perspective.  
For our purposes, another aspect of Laramée’s quote is instructive in discussing the relationship 
between immersion and Transmedia/non-participatory VR in relation to TV/film content, and that is 
‘suspension of disbelief’.  While not perhaps a universally accepted view, nevertheless suspension of 
disbelief still continues to be a tacitly acknowledged interpretation of the way in which audiences 
interact with especially fictional texts in film and television. 
 
Television entertainment involves the social convention of the “willing suspension of disbelief”, 
in which we, for a brief time, agree to accept the characters portrayed onscreen as real human 
beings so that we can identify with them and experience their joys and sorrows. (Harris & 
Sanborn, 2014) 
 
Again I have focused on television particularly as in the UK this is an industry where there are 
significant efforts being made to understand and implement the technologies of Transmedia and VR, 
and also because the nature of television content is regularly long-form, meaning that the notion of 
suspension of disbelief on the part of television audiences can continue uninterrupted for months and 
years for the same characters and story-worlds, and even for decades in the case of certain well-known 
soap opera characters.  Suspension of disbelief is therefore inherently linked with television and film in 
terms of the generally accepted understanding of the ways in which audiences interact with content, 
and it is therefore also understandable that film and TV professionals moving into Transmedia and VR 
content production will approach these new platforms from that same perspective.  However, to do so 
is a fundamental mistake, as both traditional suspension of disbelief, and its then-associated notion of 
‘displacement immersion’ cannot effectively apply to either platform. 
 
An examination of suspension of disbelief will reveal the problem, and for this we must needs move on 
from Coleridge’s initial coining of the term in relation to ‘poetic faith’ in 1817, turning instead to 
Holland and his continuing work on the psychology and psychoanalysis of suspension of disbelief as 
an act.  In his early interpretation of the term, Holland (1967) discusses how a text must fulfil certain 
criteria in order to allow an audience to suspend disbelief, namely that in order to recognise that a text 
will provide us with an entertainment pleasure, we must be able to ‘trust’ it, and this trust comes from 
the recognised ‘unreality’ of the text. 
 
We trust in works of art to give us pleasure, but it must be a pleasure from things merely 
imaginary.  Should the pleasure seem to be a pleasure from real things, we no longer trust the 
work of art que work of art. 
 
In Salen and Zimmerman’s point above, they mention the concept of the work providing the immersion 
as being framed - the ‘frame falls away’ - and this is closely related to Holland’s interpretation of 
suspension of disbelief, as he suggests that in order for this trust to take place, and for this ‘unreality’ to 
be perceived, the text must be ‘framed’ away from reality, to be clearly positioned as an unreal and 
therefore trustworthy, pleasure-inducing artefact. 
 
The conventions of art establish an isolation.  We frame the picture, house it in a museum, 
surround it with “Do Not Touch” signs.  Poems and cartoons are printed in such a way that we 
immediately recognise them as separate.  Plays happen in special places – I remember one theatre 
where you had to cross water (a moat) to enter that half-magic world.  Short stories and novels are 
often labelled as such – certainly a sentence or two tells us we are dealing with fiction, not “truth”. 
 
Holland’s conclusion from this is that during suspension of disbelief, audiences are effectively able to 
disconnect the ‘planning to act’ function of the brain from the enjoyment of the text.  He suggests an 
example of moviegoers recognising that they can enjoy the thrill of a scary film for example, without 
the need to fear for their own safety.  Updating this theory with a neuro-psychoanalytic explanation in 
2003, he suggests that suspension of disbelief has four parts: 
 
1. we no longer perceive our bodies 
2. we no longer perceive our environment 
3. we no longer judge probability or reality-test 
4. we respond emotionally to the fiction as though it were real 
 
His conclusion is that in ‘turning off’ our ‘desire to act’ function, we effectively shut-down the 
prefrontal cortex of the brain responsible for our ability to ‘plan to act’ while the corticolimbic systems 
within our brains that are responsible for emotional response remain active.  In order for this to take 
place, we must be assured that the world of the narrative is disconnected from the world outside of the 
text.  This is to ensure that we do not attempt to act within the ‘outside’ world, based on stimulus from 
the text (such as experiencing genuine personal threat from a scary movie as-per the example above).  
This is the reason for the ‘frame’, to emphasise the unreality of the text perceived, allowing emotional 
response but not necessitating physical function.  It is in this way that we can challenge one of the well-
known criticisms of the suspension of disbelief theory; that extremely unlikely events such as 
Superman’s capacity for flight are acceptable within a narrative, but his ability to disguise himself from 
co-workers simply by adopting a pair of glasses is not; the process of suspension of disbelief allows us 
to accept the unreal, but not the improbable, being as it is too closely related to our world in which we 
plan to act. 
 
It is through this notion of the ‘frame’ that we begin to see the contradiction inherent in both 
Transmedia and VR experiences.  In attempting to draw the participant ‘closer’ to the narrative, to 
remove the perceived barriers of mediation to create what is conceived as a more ‘immersive’ audience 
experience, we remove the signifiers of unreality from a text, and consequently our capacity to 
disconnect the ‘planning to act’ aspect of our experience in relation to the text is impaired.  In 
principle, the more ‘real’ a text is designed to be, the less real is its perception and at the logical end of 
this argument, the hyper-awareness inherent in VR experiences and the participatory aspect of 
Transmedia – where decisions and interactions are necessary – means that our ‘planning to act’ 
function cannot be removed in either experience.  In essence, in both Transmedia and VR, the ‘frame’ 
is incorporated within the media text as part of the experience, and for this reason it becomes harder to 
see the text as ‘unreal’, harder in-turn to disconnect the ‘planning to act’ function described, harder to 
experience a suspension of disbelief and therefore harder to achieve the type of immersive experience 
offered by Laramée; that which we have termed ‘displacement immersion’ where an audience of a 
media text forgets that they are being ‘subjected to entertainment’.  This then is the contradiction 
inherent in both technologies and the paradox of ‘displacement’ immersion simultaneously; the more 
one attempts to achieve this immersion, the less likely one is to do so. 
 
There is also a contradiction inherent in this explanation however, which is of course Holland’s 
assertion that we must be able to perceive the ‘unreality’ of a text in order to suspend disbelief, because 
our argument so far has suggested that we are unable to suspend disbelief in the case of VR and 
Transmedia experiences precisely because we perceive them as ‘unreal’.  The decision-making and 
participation in Transmedia, and the clearly mediated experience of VR – wearing a headset for 
example, the isolation of headphones, the technological issues of ‘stitched’ footage or low-resolution 
screens at such close proximity to the eyes – ensure that we are continually reminded that the text is 
false; a constructed narrative, a mediated documentary.  And yet we are still unable to suspend 
disbelief.  It is important here to remember our earlier distinction; that our discussions relate to the 
immersion within content, and not technological experiences.  When we become ‘immersed’ in a 
novel, or in a TV show, or in Japanese Kabuki theatre perhaps, where the audience ‘agrees not to see’ 
the black-clad figures on stage holding scenery and props, we are aware of the ‘rules’ of mediation, and 
we are able to then put those to one side to simply enjoy the text itself (the performance, the story etc.).  
Holland’s (2003) explanation is one of Habituation and he explains it with the analogy of wearing 
shoes: 
 
Think about your shoes. You put your shoes on in the morning and for a few seconds you are 
aware of them. You can feel them on your feet. After a few seconds, you cease to be aware of 
them, and you don't become aware of your shoes again until you take them off at night - unless 
you get a blister or a pebble. 
To continue Holland’s analogy, by including the ‘frame’ within the experience, both Transmedia and 
VR technologies can effectively cause the ‘blister or pebble’ for the participant.  Within an experience 
such as the use of VR to treat paranoia by Oxford University, or Al-Jazeera’s excellent Pirate Fishing 
Transmedia journalism experience, this continual reinforcement of unreality may be ameliorated by the 
nature of the content in the sense that in both experiences, audiences aren’t required to suspend 
disbelief in the traditional film and TV sense.  But in those texts where suspension of disbelief would 
normally be needed, such as fiction or documentary, the continued inclusion of the ‘frame’ within the 
experience is problematic, as traditionally the frame is acknowledged and then habituated to.  To 
complete the analysis, we might say that the perceived frame reinforces that the text is separate from 
reality, whereas the inclusion of the ‘frame’ in the experience – the ‘blister or pebble’ – reinforces only 
that the text is not reality. 
 
This notion of the ‘framed’ artefact allows us to explain the immersion experienced in perceiving 
clearly non-real texts such as animation, black & white films and even computer game experiences 
such as Tetris.  The clear ‘unreality’ of the texts allows for a successful and willing suspension of 
disbelief to occur, as long as audiences can be habituated to the ‘frame’.  The interesting example here 
however is Tetris, which as a computer game has a clear ‘planning to act’ function fundamentally 
attached.  Indeed, immersion is an idea that, as we have seen, has long been the subject of debate in 
ludological industries, and conclusions have been drawn that would certainly be of benefit to the 
emergent Transmedia and VR proponents in TV and film, as indeed with a reevaluation of the goal of 
immersion, it may still be achievable.  Regarding Tetris for example, Salen & Zimmerman (2004) 
quote Gorfinkel: 
 
[…] representational strategies are conflated with the effect of immersion.  Immersion itself is not 
tied to a replication or mimesis of reality.  For example, one can get immersed in Tetris.  
Therefore, immersion into game play seems at least as important as immersion into a game’s 
representational space.  It seems that these components need to be separated to do justice and 
better understand how immersion, as a category of experience and perception, works. 
 
Salen & Zimmerman conclude that Gorfinkel’s point suggests that immersion is not predicated on a 
representation of reality – a position they agree with - allowing discussions of immersion to move away 
from more traditional suspension of disbelief.  While we have seen that suspension of disbelief by its 
very nature can accommodate ‘unreal’ representations such as black & white cinema or animated 
content that only loosely resemble ‘real life’, nevertheless this is a valid criticism of our attempts to 
define immersion, as Gorfinkel’s point about the ‘immersive’ properties of Tetris is certainly accurate.  
The rejection of ‘displacement immersion’ earlier was predicated on its fundamental link to suspension 
of disbelief, and the inherent removal of the ‘planning to act’ function according to Holland.  
Consequently, doing-away with suspension of disbelief from our definition of the term may potentially 
make it possible to achieve immersion in Transmedia and VR in the manner Laramée seems to suggest.  
However, we could argue that this condition of the definition is perhaps more applicable to the games 
industry – where the point was raised – than the experience of TV and film viewers venturing into VR 
and Transmedia.  The reason is that by definition, gameplay has traditionally involved the introduction 
of a player’s imagination into the process, in a way that TV and film experiences do differently and 
arguably inconsistently. 
 
Clearly, many of the best and most engaging film and TV works rely on the capacity of suggestion to 
create the desired experience; such experiences certainly involve audience imagination, and to suggest 
otherwise is folly.  However the introduction of imagination into gameplay can take far more complex 
forms; for example there isn’t the same separation of artefact and imaginative process in TV and film 
that we can find in some games.  Describing role-playing games for example, Brown (2012) observes: 
 
In these kinds of games, the ludic framework generally requires basic representations of characters 
or items on its terms, so a sword may be represented as attack dice, or a player’s character by a 
model on a hexagonal grid.  However, most of the representational work of these games occurs in 
the player’s imagination, and the business of playing tends to take place on an imaginative and 
discursive level separate to that of the tools used to simulate character interaction. 
 
In this way, we can see the separation of gameplay experiences and that of other media texts; gameplay 
by definition requiring game players in order for the game to even exist.  As Brown acknowledges: 
 
Games need players, and this is one of the ways they are differentiated from the majority of other 
media experiences which require only audiences. 
 
Leaving aside the participatory nature of Transmedia and VR for a moment – we shall return to it 
presently – film and television experiences are traditionally closer to that of ‘art’ than that of ‘game’, in 
that there is an inherent separation between text and audience.  While games cannot exist without 
players, films arguably exist – in one interpretation at least – without audiences.  This is separate from 
Holland’s discussion of ‘framing’ art – “the altarpiece becomes art when it hangs in a museum rather 
than a church” (1967) – and simply an observation that a film or television programme could be said to 
exist independently of an audience, in the way that a game cannot.  It is understandable therefore if 
film and television professionals moving into VR and Transmedia fields approach them from this 
perspective.  However, to do so is an error as both Transmedia and VR texts, like games, are arguably 
both reliant on participation for their existence. 
 
Within this fundamental understanding of both however lies the key to the capacity for immersion that 
both platforms do contain, and this can be found in revisiting Gorfinkel’s quote above.  While Salen & 
Zimmerman rightly point out that part of the immersive experience of Tetris illustrates that immersion 
is not predicated on mimesis of ‘reality’, the deeper analysis of this separation concerns the notion that 
the representational experience and the participatory experience of the text are separate.  Immersion 
cannot take place in the representational space of a text, but it can occur in the participatory space, and 
Gorfinkel’s point is that the two are often conflated erroneously, leading to the conclusion that – as the 
more identifiable space perhaps - immersion is predicated on representation. 
 
In a recent example, typical of this approach, Reilhac (2016) enthusiastically extols the virtues of VR 
experiences thus: 
 
This incredibly powerful immersiveness of the VR experience triggers an equally powerful sense 
of presence for the viewer.  When immersed in VR, we are no longer a spectator of a reflection of 
something happening far from us; we are in the moment, in that space with the people around us, 
we are part of what we see and hear. 
 
And later: 
 
We are immersed, present, feeling total empathy and passion in this experience.  We can be 
involved; we can feel emotional depth like never before; we can engage and exchange; consider 
alternative points of view; we can experience diversity. 
 
Reilhac appears throughout this article to be referring simultaneously to representation and 
participation interchangeably as the same experience – the VR experience we might call it – and his 
definition of immersion seems also to relate simultaneously to the displacement of the senses, the 
mediated ‘wonder’ of the experience, and the participative, interactive capacity of the technology.  It is 
perhaps difficult to disagree with this assessment in one sense – we have seen the capacity of the 
technology to ‘fool the senses’ in the Oxford University ‘paranoia’ project – but if we accept 
Gorfinkel’s view that representation and participation are indeed separate – as the immersive capacity 
of something like Tetris would suggest – then what Reilhac is doing is experiencing the participative as 
the representative, and as such is not achieving immersion in the Laramée sense, but on the contrary, as 
a participant who is constantly hyper-aware that they are experiencing a mediated experience. 
 
To build on this point, Salen & Zimmerman’s introduction of the notion of metacommunication to the 
experience of gameplay examines the integration of act and meaning, noting that when engaged in a 
game, players are entering into an experience in which the activity and the meaning of that activity 
(experienced and implied) are equally understood as part of the pre-agreed construct of the experience. 
 
In the case of play, we know that metacommunication is always in operation.  A teen kissing 
another teen in Spin the Bottle or a Gran Turismo player driving a virtual race car each understand 
that their play references different realities.  But the very thing that makes their activity play is 
that they also know they are participating within a constructed reality […].  It is possible to say 
that the players of a game are “immersed” – immersed in meaning.  To play a game is to take part 
in a complex interplay of meaning.  But this kind of immersion is quite different from the sensory 
transport promised by the immersive fallacy. 
 
This notion is at the heart of the idea that immersion is possible in ludic experiences; immersion is 
caused by the act of engagement, the act of participatory gameplay.  Reilhac’s definition would 
perhaps have us believe that the Gran Turismo driver believes his race is real, or the ‘Spin the Bottle’ 
teens understand nothing implied by their actions.  It is for this reason that the traditional debates 
surrounding ludonarrative dissonance took place, where the storyline of a game being at-odds with the 
gameplay created difficulties with immersion – players finding that they couldn’t ‘get into’ a game 
properly due to disconnect between the play and the plot structure – it was the gameplay that was 
creating the immersive experience and which was compromised by non-sympathetic storytelling.   
 
If we return our focus to Transmedia and VR experiences for film and television therefore, we may be 
able to see how the lessons from ludic narratives can influence our approach to achieving immersion 
for ourselves.  By their very nature, as we have seen, VR and Transmedia are participative; arguably 
they cannot exist without participants.  So participation therefore becomes the goal of the immersive 
experience for both technologies.  The idea of simply producing observable content in both formats in 
order to ‘make the content more immersive’ is therefore problematic; the technology alone cannot 
achieve that goal.  Instead, design based around the participative qualities and meaning of texts should 
be at the forefront of TV and film projects making the transition to these technologies. 
 
Up to this point, we have been discussing Transmedia and VR texts interchangeably because the focus 
was always on immersion as a concept.  However, when we begin to discuss meaning and 
participation, this is where the two fundamentally different technologies must naturally diverge.  How 
to create meaning and participation effectively across both disciplines is not a subject for this paper; all 
we have been concerned with here is identifying how the current goal of ‘immersion’ is unachievable, 
and replacing it with a version that is.  However, we can discuss prevalent examples of both 
disciplines.  In Transmedia for example, one of the most interesting recent instances of immersion is 
The Modular Body project.  This is an online non-linear sci-fi story experience about using bio-printers 
to create organ modules (a ‘brain module’, a ‘digestive module’) to construct creatures.  One such, 
‘Project Oscar’, is a primitive and unnerving creation clearly designed to be an unsettling watch for 
audiences.  The experience is clearly stated on the website and social media as being fictional, and 
there is no clear effort to deceive audiences.  However, the short videos and text that form the ‘objects’ 
of the experience, as the BBC might call it, are believably real, with effective and sympathetic 
production values and visual effects, and the result has been a sharing through social media of single 
elements from the story experience, often without reference to the original site, by participants who 
believed that what they were sharing was real.  This is the interesting immersive capacity of 
Transmedia storytelling; in this experience the story was not the non-linear narrative on the website, 
but the participative reality of audiences sharing and commenting on creepy videos, complete with 
philosophical and moral debates from those genuinely believing that their experience was real, and 
collectively creating the ‘Modular Body story’ as a real-time, real-world narrative of participation and 
meaning. 
 
As one example of this within VR, one of my own experiences working with students at the University 
of Gloucestershire has been the delight and desire of participants experiencing VR content to explain to 
others what they are experiencing in real-time.  Early experiments with participants experiencing 
mixed-media VR experiences for example, such as visuals from one source and audio – normally 
binaural recordings – from a separate source has created some interesting unique experiences for 
participants, most of whom mentioned afterward that their sense of immersion within the text was 
comparable to immersion in ‘traditional’ TV content, and yet part of this came from the desire to share 
verbally in real-time what they were experiencing.  This could take the form of descriptions of the 
experience, explanation of emotional responses including the disconnect from those they were 
addressing or amusement at their unexpected reactions to the content.  This paper will not look further 
at this research as our experiments in VR (our Dark Spaces VR experience is in production) and 
Transmedia (our Project Spider Transmedia experience is being developed) will be published more 
completely elsewhere. 
 
Throughout this paper there has been no suggestion that producers of film and TV experiences should 
not be looking into VR and Transmedia content due to the immersion problem; on the contrary both 
disciplines offer extraordinary emerging opportunities for exciting and engaging new audience 
experiences and creative endeavours which will ultimately integrate very well into the way audiences 
interact with film and TV.  Indeed, the purpose of this paper was to demonstrate that without 
interrogation and classification, the use of terms such as immersion could potentially slow and derail 
the progress of VR and Transmedia in these fields, simply because as we have seen, immersion is a 
goal, and the idea appears to be that the technology alone will provide that experience for audiences.  
Naturally, the one element omitted from this discussion is that which is almost self-evidently the most 
important; the strength and quality of the content itself, just as it always is in any film or TV text, 
because an engaging story is always an engaging story, independent of the technology used to tell it.  
But acknowledging that, this paper has hopefully demonstrated that when discussing immersion within 
a technological experience, we are meaning something quite different to when we are discussing 
immersion into the content played on that experience.  This is because in order to achieve immersion in 
content, we must be able to suspend disbelief, even for factual content; we must be able to forget the 
mediation of the content and focus on it alone.  Holland suggests that we do this by becoming 
habituated to a ‘frame’ that separates the content from the ‘real world’, and the suggestion made in this 
paper is that this is not achievable when the ‘frame’ is included within the experience, as then we 
cannot simply focus on the content alone.  This is because unlike film and TV, VR and Transmedia 
arguably cannot exist independently, they require audiences for their existence.  Immersion then takes 
place within these experiences in the participative space of the content, and not the representational 
space as in film and TV.  To conclude therefore, immersion is possible within VR and Transmedia 
content, but it must be participative in some way; users must be able to become immersed in the 
participation and meaning of the text, and not simply observers of representational content in new 
environments.  This is a view gaining increasing momentum within VR and Transmedia circles – 
Reilhac’s February 2016 Indiewire article for example suggesting that VR experiences are not to be 
linked directly with film or gaming, because they are now strong enough on their own terms, is a case 
in point – although there is still a place for these technologies to integrate with film and TV, as long as 
it is understood that they cannot simply be an extension of an existing experience, but something new. 
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